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Official Soviet Data on Industrial Production
THE basic Soviet accounts of aggregate industrial production are kept in
the form of gross value of industrial production, in both current and
"constant" rubles. The comprehensive accounts have not been published
for any year, and the few figures that have been made public refer to the
interwar period.The data shown here (Tables F-l and F-3) have
generally been reconstructed from the few available figures, some derived
indirectly, and published index numbers (Table F-2) or other relation-
ships.
The nature of the Soviet production accounts has been carefully
described elsewhere' and cannot be given satisfactorily in brief compass.
The few notes written here are intended merely to highlight some of the
considerations needed to interpret the assembled data.
lt'Iajor Categories of Gross Production
Following Marxian doctrine, industrial products are broken down into
two primary categories: Group "A" and Group "B," sometimes referred
to rather inaccurately as "producer goods" and "consumer goods." The
former represent goods—and some services—used to produce other
goods; the latter, goods used to produce services in households and other
"nonproductive" sectors of the economy (as education, health services,
government). This formal dichotomy leaves room for trouble in deciding
where specific items should be entered, and we know from the Soviet
literature on the subject that a number of arbitrary decisions are
made.In the absence of detailed published accounts, we are left in
the dark, however, on how some of the more important issues are
resolved.
For example, where are military products recorded?In principle,
they would seem to belong in Group "B," but they could hardly have
been recorded there as late as 1945 since they undoubtedly exceeded
"B" goods in gross value that year (see Table F-l). As we shall discuss
further below, some important changes were apparently made in the
production accounts at the time of the shift from "1926/27" prices to
"1952" prices, and the change in the gross value for machine building,
taken together with the data on "tools of labor" (orudiia truda), suggests
1See,e.g., an excellent article by Alec Nove (538).Seealso our discussion of official
production indexes in Chapter 5 and the references given there.
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TABLE
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14. Military productse 8.5 24.6 (44.6) (6.8)(17)
Figures in parentheses are residuals or indirect estimates.
Sumsand detail may not agree becauseof rounding.
oExcludesturnover taxes, except those levied on industrial materials consumed within
industry. See Table F-3 and text.
bPricesof January 1, 1952, and July 1, 1955, with important exceptions.See text.
COrudiiatruda.This seems to be machinery and equipment plus repair shops minus
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F-i
IN SOVIET INDUSTRY, BENCHMARK YEARS (billion rubles)
"1952" Pricesb "1955"Pricesb
1950B 1953 1955A 1955B 1956 1957 1958
(451) (655) (834) (766) (847) (932) (1,030)
(310) (453) (589) (540) (600) (664) (740)
(141) (202) (248) (226) (247) (268) (290)
(192) (302) (417) (384) (436) (494) (562)
(73) (123) (177) (163) (190) (221) (253)
(179) (246) (273) (309)
(81) (131) (183) (167) (198) (232) (266)
(229) (322) (406) (373) (402) (432) (474)
(149) (213) (271) (248) (264) (286) (311)
(81) (109) (135) (124) (138) (146) (163)
(16) (39) (44) (42)
consumer durables.If this interpretation is correct, the latter would be about 4 billion
rubles for 1950 and about 12 billion for 1955, in "1952" and "1955" prices, respectively.
d Predmety truda.
e Estimated earmarked expenditures on military products, excluding such things as
atomic energy.Over 1950—1955, estimates are probably too high in view of recent




191'3—1950A: Value in 1933 (45,955 million rubles as given in 241, 7—li, and
362,1935,No. 7, 41—49) extrapolated by index (see Table
F-2 and, for 1933, 180, 32).
I 955A, B: Gross production iess turnover taxes (800 billion current rubles
from Table F-3) corrected by price index. We assume that
half the volume of production occurred before July 1, 1955,
when the "1955" prices became effective.Since "1955"
prices were apparently 0.92 of "1952" prices when properly
weighted (580, 1956, 1-4), gross industrial production may
be estimated as follows (billion rubles):
Current "1952" "1955"
Prices Prices Prices
First half, 1955 417 417 383
Second half, 1955 383 417 383
Total 800 834 766
1950B, 1953: l955A extrapolated by index (see Table F-2).
1956—1958: 1955B extrapolated by index (see Table F-2). The figure for
1958 checks roughly with the statement by Khrushchev,
364, 1/28/59 (451, XI, 3,6)that an increaseingross
industrial production by 1% in 1959 would amount to more
than 11 billion rubles.
Lines 2 and 3
1913—1940, 1946,
1950B—1955: Line 1 times percentages in 180, 13.
1945, 1950A: 1932 extrapolated by index in 180, 33.See text for reason in
case of 1950A.
1956—1958: Line 1 times percentages in 141, 147.
Line 4
1928—1950A: 1932 extrapolated by index (see Table F-2).1932 derived from
1933 value (42,261 million rubles as given in 241, 7—11) and
1933 as per cent of 1932 (105% as given in 180, 33).
Line5
1928—1950A: Residual, all industry (line 1) minus large-scale industry (line 4).
Line 6
1913—1932,
1940—1950A: 1937 extrapolatedby index (see Table F-2).
1937: 490,86.
1955A, B: Machine building and metalworking are stated (34, 35) to
account for about 50% of gross industrial production in
1954—55. This figure is explicitly identified as an estimate.
The same source gives the share for 1940 as 31%, which is
less than our implied estimate of 35% or the figure of 36.3%
given by Voznesensky (292, 45).It may be that repair shops
are excluded in the Soviet estimate.
1950B, 1953: 1955A extrapolated by index (see Table F-2).
1956—1958: 1955B extrapolated by index (see Table F-2).
Line7
1928: 1928/29 in current prices from Table C-2.This year is used
because current data for it are consistent with the implied
official 1928 figure for machine building and metalworking
in "1926/27" prices. The alternative would have been to
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estimate a current value for 1928 and translateit into
"1926/27" prices. Both adjustments would have been largely
arbitrary.
1932: Large-scale value multiplied by ratio of total to large-scale in
1933.For basic data, see 467, 340, series excluding repair
shops.
1937: Large-scale value (467, 340) plus estimated small-scale value.
The latter (565 million rubles) is taken to be 10.0 per Cent of
total value of small-scale industry, the percentage for 1933.
For 1933 data on small-scale sectors, see 467 and 362,1935,
No. 7, 41—49.
1940: Machine building and metalworking times 0.833, interpolated
ratio between 1937 and 1941 Plan. For 1941 Plan data, see
490, 181.
1945—1950A: 1940 extrapolated by index (see Table F-2).
195GB, 1953: 1955A extrapolated by index (see Table F-2).
1955A: Taken as same ratio to line 6 as for 1955B.
1955B—1957: 1958 extrapolated by index (see Table F-2).
1958: Based on line1 and statement (410, 1959, No. 8,11) that
machine building accounted for 25% of gross industrial
production.
Line 8
1928: 1928/29 from Table C-2. See line 7, same year.
1932 and 1937: Residual, line 6 minus lines 7 and 9.
1940—l950A, 1953,
1956—1958: Residual, combined with repair shops, line 6 minus line 7.
195GB, 1955; Combined residual (line 6 minus line 7) for metal products
and repair shops distributed on the basis of the following






1928—1937: 467, 340.Difference between series including and excluding
repair shops.
1940—1958: See line 8.
Line 10—13
1950B—1957: Group "A" (line 2) broken down by percentage distribution
(180, 13;141,148;and 141a, 149).
Line14
1937: Table A-9, note to 1937.
1940: Estimated value in current rubles (31.0 billion from Table A-9)
divided by 1.26 (see same table, note to 1937).
1945—1950A: Estimated value in current rubles, assumed to be the same as
"1926/27." From Table A-9, col. 2.
1950B, 1953, 1955A:Estimated value in current rubles (Table A-9) deflated by
price index for basic industrial materials (estimate A, Table
A- 10).
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1956—1957: 141, 60.Index with 1913 =100.
1958: 141a, 141. Index with 1913 100.
Lines 2 and 3
1913: 180,9.
1928—1955: 180,32.
1956—1957: 141, 60. Index with 1913 =100.








1953, 1956—1957: 141, 52f, 229. Index with 1913 =100.
1958: 141a, 146.Index with 1940 =100.
Line7
1928—1940: Derived from gross production estimates in Table F-i.
1945—1955: 180,203.Index with 1940100.
1956—1957: 141,135.Index with 1940 =100.
1958: 141a,146.Index with =100.
Line8 and 9
1928—1958: Derived from gross production estimates in Table F-i.
Line 10—13
1950,1955: 180, 13.




1937—1955: Derived from gross production estimates in Table F-i.
Lines15 and 16
1913—1937: 180,319,367. Index with 1955 as per cent of these years.
1940—1957: 241, 139f. Index with 1940 =100.
1958: lIla, 146. Index with 1940 =100.
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TABLEF-3




3. Profits (mci. subsidized losses) 72
4."Commercial" outlays and misc, charges 27
5.Production outlays 700
6. Cost of materials consumed 530
7. Raw and basic materials 420




12. Employee compensation (mc!. social insurance deductions)150
13. Unallocated outlays 22
14.Net production 500
15.Turnover taxes 242
16. Profits (mci. subsidized losses) 72
17.Net "commercial" outlays and misc. charges 21
18.Employee compensation (mci. social insurance deductions) 150
19.Net unallocated outlays 17
General Note: Sums and detail may not be consistent because of rounding.
The concepts of gross and net production are intended to be
those on a "commercial cost" basis outlined by Nove in 538.
We are also indebted to Nove for bringing important source
materials to our attention, as indicated below.
Line 1: Net production (line 14) divided by its share in gross production
(given as 0.48 by Notkin in 410, 1956, No. 9, 6). From the
context it seems clear that Notkin refers to magnitudes in
"realized" prices, i.e., including turnover taxes. He also seems
to refer to current prices, since he gives national income as 50%
of aggregate social product, a fraction identified elsewhere
(363,1957, No.8, 76) as applying to current prices.Gross
production as derived here is not entirely consistent with the
statement(364,5/31157)that Ukrainian gross production
(preliminarily estimated as 177 billion in 365,1/19/56)was
"almost a fifth" of Soviet gross production. These sources were
brought to our attention by Nove.
Line 2: 141a, 799. We assume all turnover taxes are assigned to industry
in official Soviet national income accounts. Note that some of
these taxes are double-counted to an unknown extent in lines
4, 6—11, and 13, since turnover taxes are levied on some of the
intermediate products consumed within industry.
Line3: Sum of net profits of state enterprises and industrial cooperatives
(141a, 799) plus estimate of 5 billion rubles for subsidized losses.
The latter seems consistent with estimates of subsidized losses in
491, 143.
Lines 4—13: Mutually determined on the basis of the followingrelations.
Production outlays (F) plus "commercial" outlays (C) are equal
to gross production minus the sum of turnover taxes and profits.
Employee compensation (E) plus "commercial" and unallocated
outlays (U), both net of materials consumed, are equal to net
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that military products may have been transferredat that time to
Group "B."
Recent statistical sources have published a percentage breakdown of
Group "A" goods into tools of labor and materials of labor (predmety
truda), the latter being further broken down into materials used in
making "A" goods (materials of category I) and "B" goods (materials of
category II).The classification"tools of labor" apparently covers
machinery and equipment (including repairs carried out in repair shops)
except consumer durables. Most military equipment may also be ex-
cluded, as noted below. This interpretation is supported by the movement
of the Group "B" official production index relative to the official indexes
for the light and food industries.
Another major category for which data on gross production can be
reconstructed is "machine building and metalworking." This category
overlaps all the others discussed to this point.Its three main subdivisions
are machine building, metal products, and repair shops.Machine
building apparently includes machinery and equipment of all kinds—
hence both "A" and "B" goods—except that, as we have noted, military
Notes to Table F—2 (continued)
production minus the sum of turnover taxes and profits (538,
265 f).For unallocated outlays, materials consumed are taken
in Soviet statistics as 24% of the outlays (538); we assume the
same percentage holds for "commercial" outlays. The percent-
age distribution of production outlays is given (180, 29) for cost
of materials (M) and its components, employee compensation,
and unallocated outlays. Hence we have the following equations
whose solution is given in the body of the table:
P + C =725billion rubles




It should be noted that all items involving materials (lines 4,
6—11, and 13) include such turnover taxes as were levied on
those materials, witE an unknown extent of doublecounting.
Line Estimated national income (928 billion rubles) times 0.54, the
fraction accounted for by industry (363, No. 8, 76f).
National income is Nove's estimate of 1,100 billion rubles for
1957 (based on seemingly firm evidence summarized in 538a)
extrapolated to 1955 by the official index (141, 95). Since the
latter is in terms of "constant" prices, this calculation is subject
to undeterminable error.
Lines 15, 16, and 18.- Lines 2—4 and 12.
Line: 17 and 19.- 76% of lines 4 and 13.
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equipment may have been removed at the time of the shift from "1926/27"
to "1952" prices and placed with metal products. Metal also
fall into both "A" and "B" categories, and they include intermediate
materials as well as final products. Finally, repair shops are apparently
those specialized establishments that repair and rebuild machinery and
equipment of various kinds;the value of their activity seems to be
counted entirely within the "A" category.
For some years, statistics can also be broken down for large- and
small-scale industry.This classification is explained in some detail in
Chapter 7, and it seems better to refer to that discussion than to attempt
a brief and inadequate summary.
Role of Turnover Taxes
A special problem in interpreting Soviet data on the value of industrial
output is created by the treatment of turnover taxes, which have their
primary incidence on "B" goods.According to established Soviet
doctrine, turnover taxes—including those levied on agricultural products
—represent the product of all industry that is transferred to the state,
being collected for financial convenience from certain industries.In
national product accounts, turnover taxes are therefore included in the
product attributed to industry. A case in point is the total gross production
shown in line1 of Table F-3, which also includes an undeterminable
amount of double counting of turnover taxes to the extent that they are
levied on intermediate products consumed within industry. That is to
say, some of the turnover taxes (line 2 of Table F-3) attributed to the
gross production of industry are already included, perhaps several times,
in the gross production "net" of turnover taxes (line I minus line 2) to
the extent that they appear in the prices of intermediate products
consumed within industry.
In internal industrial accounts, gross production is recorded "net"
of turnover taxes, in the sense just explained. That is, output of each
good is evaluated at its price net of the turnover tax levied on it, so that
turnover taxes are included only to the extent that they are levied on
materials consumed within industry.For example, the gross value of
shoes does not include the turnover tax on shoes, but it does include
any turnover tax on the leather used in making shoes—and on things
used in making leather, and so on. The gross production of industry used
in these accounts would be the sum of lines 3—5 in Table F-3.The
accounts reconstructed in Table F-i and F-2 were presumably calculated
in this way, except that they are expressed in "constant" prices.
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Net Production
The net production of industry, though calculated by Soviet statisticians
as part of national income, has not been published since the mid-thirties,
and it cannot be derived from the accounts thus far discussed.Using
indirect procedures, we have estimated net production, as defined in
Soviet national income accounts, for 1955 in current rubles (Table F-3).
The Soviet concept of net production differs somewhat from the U.S.
concept of value added in that the former is net of amortization charges,
but these charges are generally small, much smaller than depreciation
calculated under U.S. accounting practices. A more important difference
arises from the inclusion of turnover taxes in the Soviet concept. While
it is true that business taxes are also included in U.S. value added, they
are relatively so much smaller that they are not at all comparable.
The comparability of Soviet net production with U.S. value added is
perhaps best examined by considering the share of employee compensation
in. each. For 1955, employee compensation accounted for 55 per cent of
value added in U.S. manufacturing; if income of unincorporated enter-
prises is added to employee compensation, the fraction is 56 per cent.2
We see from Table F-3 that employee compensation accounted for only
30 per cent of Soviet net industrial production in the same year if turnover
taxes are included, but for 58 per cent if they are excluded. For Soviet
net production including turnover taxes to be comparable with U.S.
value added in coverage, the share of production attributable to capital
would have to be half again as large in the Soviet Union as it is in the
United States, which seems unlikely.It would therefore seem that value
added as measured in the United States is approximately equivalent to
Soviet net production excluding turnover taxes, or at least a very large
part of them.3
Industrial Production Account for 1955 in Current Rubles
The production account in Table F-3 is erected, by means of various
internal relations revealed here and there in the Soviet literature, on
independent estimates of net production, profits, and turnover taxes.
2649,1958, 493, 774.
In a recent article, Academician S. G. Strumilin presents some estimates of net
production for industry in "1926/27" prices (see 256a, 233—242). Among other things,
it is interesting to note that he considers employee compensation to be 57 per cent of
net production, a fraction he treats as constant over the Plan period, and net production
in 1955 to be 30.6 per cent of gross production.If gross and net production are both
taken as excluding turnover taxes, the corresponding fractions derived from Table F-3
are 58 and 32.3 per cent.
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Thus, net production is derived as a percentage of national income;
gross production is derived as a percentage of net production; and the
items within gross production (except, of course, profits and turnover
taxes) are mutually derived from a set of relations explained in that
table.
If the production account has been properly reconstructed (there is
room for error), our interpretation of the Soviet treatment of turnover
taxes outlined above seems to be confirmed. Note that net production is
estimated at about 500 billion rubles, and that the gross production of
about 1,040 billion rubles is derived from net production.Similarly,
cost of materials is derived from gross production minus turnover taxes
and profits. Both net and gross production are known to include turnover
taxes, but it is not entirely clear from Soviet sources to what extent those
taxes are included. This seems to become clear from the reconstructed
production account. If we subtract from net production the total amount
of turnover taxes paid to the government, we are left with 258 billion
rubles. Similarly, if we subtract the same amount from gross production,
we derive the cost of materials as 536 billion rubles.Gross production
then consists of the following items (billion rubles):
Net production excluding turnover taxes 258
Cost of materials consumed in "commercial"
and production outlays 536
Turnover taxes 242
Total (rounded) 1,040
The three items are consistent with each other, and this would not be
the case if only a fraction of turnover taxes were considered as included in
net and gross production: the total derived here would come out larger
than the independently derived 1,040 billion rubles, because cost of
materials would be larger.
It is very difficult to check the accuracy of the reconstructed account
in any other way, since, to our knowledge, none of the components has
been independently published. A partial check is provided by various
indirect estimates of employee compensation, usually in the form of
average annual or hourly earnings, made by Soviet and Western econo-
mists; but they extend over a wide range, often apply to the wrong year,
and usually cover a broader sector of the economy than industry alone.
In other words, they do not seem to be inherently more reliable than the
estimate that we have reconstructed.It is nevertheless important to see
how they compare with ours.
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On the Soviet side, Academician Strumlin has estimated that average
hourly earnings, apparently in industry only, were 4 rubles an hour
around 1 955•4 This implies aggregate employee compensation of 160 to
170 billion rubles (see our estimate of annual hours worked in Table
A-23), or 10 to 20 billion more than our estimate. On the Western side,
a figure somewhat lower than this is implied by Janet Chapman's estimate
that 1952 average annual earnings of workers and employees were 8,050
rubles in the nonagricultural sector and 7,800 rubIes in the economy as
a whole,5 if we assume that the average had not changed significantly
by 1955 and that it applied to the 17.4 million wage and salary earners,
with the 2 to 3 million other workers—members of producer cooperatives
and collective farms—earning substantially less (for employment data,
see Table C-i). An even lower figure for aggregate employee com-
pensation, perhaps about equal to ours, is implied by the BLS estimate
that average annual earnings of all workers and employees was about
7,200 rubles in 1953.6 Finally, a figure below ours is implied by Solomon
Schwarz's estimate of 5,200 to 5,400 rubles for average annual earnings
of all workers and employees in It therefore seems that our
estimate of employee compensation is bracketed by those made by
prominent scholars in the field of Soviet labor.
Data in "Constant" Prices
Since the characteristics of Soviet gross production in "constant" prices
are discussed in Chapter 5, we shall confine ourselves here to a few
comments on some of the apparent revisions made in the series on two
occasions, when the system of price weights was changed. Through 1950
the series was expressed in so-called "1926/27" prices. For the succeeding
two years, it was temporarily extended by a link based on current prices,
a revised link being calculated later when 1952 prices were adopted as
the unit of measure. The data continued to be expressed in "1952"
prices through 1955, when a new link was established using "1955"
prices. The latter have continued in effect up to the present.
From internal evidence it is seen that Soviet production accounts were
substantially revised in connection with the shift from "1926/27" to
"1952" prices, though the exact nature of the revision can only be
surmised. We note, first of all, that for 1950 the percentage breakdown
of gross production into "A" and "B" goods is different in the two sets of





prices.This may be seen by comparing published index numbers for
"A" and "B" goods based on "1926/27" prices with the published
percentage breakdown of gross production into the two categories.8 For
benchmark years within the period 1913—1946, the two sets of data are
consistent; that is, the same values of gross production are derived for
"A" and "B" goods either by extrapolating base figures by the indexes
or by multiplying total gross production by the given percentages. For





Group "A" 175.0 166.3
Group "B" 66.7 75.4
Total 241.7 241.7
Since the figures derived from indexes based on "1926/27" prices sum to
the known total for gross industrial production in "1926/27" prices, we
may infer that the percentage breakdown implied by those figures
(72.4 and 27.6 per cent) refers to values in "1926/27" prices, while the
published percentage breakdown underlying the figures in the second
column above (68.8 and 31.2 per cent) refers to values in "1952" prices.
The question next arises whether this revision reflects merely changes
in relative prices—a raising of "B" prices relative to "A" prices—or a
reclassification of goods as well. There is some internal evidence to suggest
that the latter may have been the case, if the reconstruction of accounts in
Table F-l is essentially correct.Note that, according to those recon-
structed data, the gross production of machine building in 1950 was
reduced from 94 to 73 billion rubles, or by 21 billion rubles, while the
gross production of metal products and repair shops was raised from 10
to about 120 billion rubles, or by 110 billion rubles. Although there is
good reason to believe that the gross value of machinery and equipment
in "1926/27" rubles was not less than the gross value in either current or
"1952" rubles, it seems unlikely that the former actually exceeded the
latter by 29 per cent, as would be implied if the entire adjustment were
in prices alone.
A possible and plausible explanation is that conventional military
products formerly classified under machine building were transferred to
metal products and that the prices of machinery and equipment were not
8180,9—13,31—33; 141,60,137.
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changed. Our estimate of 1950 expenditures on conventional military
products in current rubles, about the same as "1926/27" rubles,is
17 billion rubles, which differs insignificantly from the calculated 21 billion
rubles by which machine building was reduced in view of probable
estimating errors and of double counting in the latter item.If this ex-
planation seems reasonable, one may also infer that military products were
simultaneously shifted from "A" to "B" goods, because the values for
machine building and tools of labor are consistent in "1952" prices (see
Table F-i), and also because the official index for "B" goods shows a sharper
rise over most years after 1950 than either of the indexes for the component
light and food industries, a condition that does not apply to the prewar
period (see Table F-2). Following these suppositions, we could reconstruct
the 1950 accounts in "1926/27" prices to make them approximately com-
parable in coverage with those in "1952" prices. This is done in the follow-
ing table (billion rubles for 1950): "1926/27" "19.52"
Prices Prices
Group"A" 154 310
Toolsof labor 81 81
Materials 73 229
Group "B" 88 141
Machine building 73 73
Metal products and
repair shops 31 119
We may now compare the price changes for 1950 implied by these
revised accounts with those implied by the accounts as given in Table F- 1:
Value in "1952" Prices as
%ofValue in "1926/27" Prices
Accountsin Revised
TableF-l Accounts
Group "A" 177 201
Tools of labor 71 100
Materials 376 314
Group "B" 211 160
Machine building 71 100
Metal products and
repair shops 1,227 384
For the first column, we have taken the implied price change for machine
building as applying to tools of labor as well, and from this we have
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deriveda value in "1926/27" rubles for both the latter and materials
(114 and 61 billion rubles, respectively). The pattern of price changes
seems to be more plausible and consistent in the second column than in the
first.It seems particularly odd and inconsistent to find the price level for
metal products and repair shops shown as multiplying twelve times,
while the price level for machine building—a related classification—is
shown as declining and that for materials—another related classification
—as multiplying less than four times. We conclude that some reclassifica-
tion of products, such as supposed for the second column, took place in
connection with the shift from "1926/27" to "1952" prices.
In passing, we should note one important difficulty in comparing data
for machine building and metalworking with data for military products.
The former refer to gross value and hence include double counting of
products to the extent that enterprises classified within that category
specialize in particular stages for fabrication. The latter refer to expendi-
tures on end products only and hence exclude double counting. We may
presume that industrial specialization has increased over the years so that
there has been an upward trend in double counting. The figures as
given therefore understate the relative importance of military production
more for 1955 than for 1950 or earlier years.It may even be that some
of the increase in gross production of metal products that accompanied
the shift from "1926/27" to "1952" prices is attributable to a reorganiza-
tion of statistical recording of output leading to more double counting.
We should also note that atomic energy is probably included in the
category of machine building, since it is administratively organized under
a special Ministry for Medium Machine Building.Inclusion of atomic
energy, together growing specialization, could help to explain the
fact that gross production in machine building shows a much sharper
percentage rise between 1950 and 1955 than can be accounted for by
civilian machinery (see the indexes in Table A-8).
By contrast, the change-over from "19.52" to "1955" prices seems to
have involved few adjustments. For one thing, there was no change in
the relative prices of "A" and "B" goods. This is shown by the fact that
the published percentage breakdowns for 1955 and later years coincide
with the ones derived from production indexes. We therefore infer that
values for "A" and "B" goods were multiplied by the same factor (0.92)
in shifting from "1952" to "1955" prices.9
°Twosources (580,1956,1—4; and 423,56f) suggest that prices fell more relatively
for "A" than for "B" goods.If this was so, as it well may have been, Soviet statistical
authorities apparently did not adjust the accounts for 1955 accordingly.
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The data for large-scale production of machine building in the late
1920's, as published in the interwar period, apparently included metal
products as well as machinery and equipment, as may be seen by compar-
ing those data'° with figures taken from our Table C-2 (million rubles):
Machine Building
Interwar
Sources, Table C-2,Machine Building and
"1926/27" CurrentMetal Products, Table







Since wholesale industrial prices fell gradually and slightly during the
years in question," the figures in the first column seem to refer to the
same products as those in the third.The apparent inclusion of metal
products in the early official figures may explain why no index for
machine building is given in postwar statistical sources for years before
1940.
Annex: Data Published in 1960
The Soviet statistical handbook published in196012 contains some
important information on industry that, because of its late appearance,
could not be carefully analyzed and integrated into this study, though
minor revisions were made where possible and appropriate. We present
here, with a brief commentary, some additional data bearing most
directly on the estimates of gross and net industrial production given in
the main body of this appendix.
For the first time in postwar years, a percentage breakdown has been
given for gross social product and national income, both according to
their Soviet definitions. These breakdowns may be combined with other
information in a recent speech by Khrushchev to reproduce estimated




absolute magnitudes for 1959 in "1958" rubles (see Table F-4). The
resulting estimates for gross and net industrial production are derived
essentially independently of each other, enabling us to construct a
TABLE F-4
OFFICIAL DATA ON SOVIET GRoss SOCIAL PRODUCT AND NATIONAL INCOME, 1959
PerCent Billion "1958" Rubles
Gross Gross
Social National Social National
Product Income Product Income
Total 100.0 100.0 2,430 1,330
Industry 61.3 52.7 1,490 700
Agriculture 17.5 20.9 425 280
Construction 10.5 10.2 255 135
Transportationandcommunication 4.1 4.8 100 60
Others 6.6 11.4 160 90
GENERAL NOTE: The percentage distributions are given in lIla, 78. The fact that
the accounts are in "1958" rubles is indicated in 141a, 829. The items for gross social
product in rubles are derived from gross industrial production (including turnover taxes)
and the percentage distribution;the items for national income in rubles, from total
national income and the percentage distribution. Gross industrial production was said by
Khrushchev in his speech of May 5, 1960, to the Supreme Soviet (151, XII,18,p. 11) to be
"already approaching 1,500 billion rubles." National income is derived from the following
information in the same source:(a) the increase in 1959 was 8 per cent or 100 billion
rubles (p.11); and (b) national income planned for 1960 is about 1,450 billion rubles, an
increase of 9 per cent (p. 5). We have interpreted the following statements in the same
source as applying to gross industrial production net of turnover taxes:(a) "a rise in labor
productivity ofjust 1 per cent in the current year [1960] would yield the country's industry
as a whole additional output of almost 13,000,000,000 rubles" (p. 11); and (b) the increase
in 1959 was more than 11 per cent instead of the planned 7.7 per cent, or 50 billion rubles
more than planned (p. 5).
seemingly more reliable production account for 1959 (see Table F-5)
than for 1955. On the basis of those two accounts, one can compare
percentage increases inofficialfigures for gross and net industrial
production.
In current prices ("1958" prices for 1959), gross production excluding
turnover taxes rose by 48 per cent over 1955—1959 (Tables F-3 and F-5).
This is about the same as the growth of 49 per cent shown by the official
index in "1955" prices,13 which provides some ground for confidence in
this part of the reconstructed accounts. Net production excluding turn-
over taxes rose by 51 per cent, or somewhat more.(Net production
1014Th,141, 145.
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including turnover taxes rose by 40 per cent, or substantially less.)
However, there was a significant shift in the structure of net production
over this period, the percentage share rising for profits and falling for
TABLE F-5
ESTIMATED SOVIET INDUSTRIAL PRODUCTION ACCOUNT, 1959
(billion current rubles)
1.Gross production 1 ,490a
2.Turnover taxes 311
3. Profits (md. subsidized losses) 130
4."Commercial" outlays and misc, charges 60
5. Production outlays 990
6. Cost of materials consumed 770
7. Raw and basic materials 630








16. Profits (mci. subsidized losses) 130
17.Net "commercial" outlays and misc, charges 46
18.Employee compensation (including social insurance deductions) 190
19.Net unallocated outlays 24
a "1958" rubles.
GENERAL NOTE: See general note to Table F-3.
Line 1: From Table F-4.
Line 2.' 141a, 799.
Line 3: Sum of net profits of state enterprises and producer cooperatives
(141a), plus estimate of 5 billion rubles for subsidized losses.
Lines 4—13: See Table F-3, same lines.Percentage distribution of productive
outlays from 141a, 161.The following equations are solved
simultaneously:
P + C =1,049billion rubles




Line 14: From Table F-4.
Lines 15, 16, and 18: Lines 2—4 and 12.
Lines 17 and 19: 76% of lines 4 and 13.
turnover taxes and employee compensation. Such a change could have
been effected solely for fiscal convenience—for example, to facilitate a
switch from turnover to profits taxes—and may have no relation to
economic factors.Employee compensation accounted for 58 per cent
of net production (excluding turnover taxes) in 1955 but for only 49
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per cent in 1959.Put another way, employee compensation rose by
only 27 per cent while net production (excluding turnover taxes) rose by
51 per cent. Under such circumstances, it is hardly possible to know
what is a proper measure of net production. Incidentally, the figure of
190 billion rubles for employee compensation in 1959, if more or less
accurate, suggests that the figure of 150 billion rubles for 1955 is not
seriously in error.
The latest statistical handbook also publishes the results of the large-
scale revaluation of capital in the Soviet economy at replacement cost
as of January 1, 1960.14 We may note here that the replacement cost of
industrial capital (including inventory but excluding land, depreciated
assets, and fiduciary assets) comes to about 600 billion rubles.'5 Un-
fortunately, this figure cannot be directly compared with estimates of
capital in U.S. industry'6 because of important differences in the
definition of capital.
141a,65 if.
141a,67, 75.
16See,e.g., 614a.
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